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The Bertrand- Borel Debate and the Origins of the 
Neyman-Pearson Theory1 
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Abstract 
The views of the mathematicians Bertrand and Borel on hypothesis testing 
and the usefulness of probability models are reviewed as background to th~ 
Neyman-Pearson theory. There is a discussion of Neyman's claim that these 
views had an influence on his work with Pearson, and of Pearson's denial of 
this claim. 
1 Introduction 
Throughout the 19th Century, hypothesis testing was carried out in various 
different areas of application along the lines laid down in the "Theorie An-
alytique des Probabilites" by Laplace (1812, 1814, 1820) and in Poisson's 
"Recherches sur la Probabilite des Jugements" (1837). Nearly all of this 
work was asymptotic, based on De Moivre's normal approximation to the 
1 Research supported by NSF Grant No. DMS-8908670. 
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binomial and Laplace's central limit theorem. Toward the end of the cen-
tury, the approach wa.s summarized by Edgeworth ( 1895) and extended in 
a.n important new direction by Ka.rl Pearson (1900). 
A new phase, small-sample theory, wa.s ushered in by Student (1908) 
a.nd wa.s developed by Fisher in a. series of papers culminating in his book 
"Statistical Methods for Research Workers" (1925}. In all the work up 
to this point the test wa.s taken a.s given (on intuitive grounds) a.nd the 
emphasis wa.s on the calculation of the p-val.ue or, when a. Bayesian approach 
wa.s used, on the probability of the hypothesis being true. 
The final step, a.sking how to choose the test, wa.s taken by Neyman and 
E.S. Pearson (1928, 1933) who formulated the prol:>lem and to ala.rge extent 
solved it. These authors give somewhat different accounts of the main 
influences that inspired theni in this work. Pearson (1939, 1966) attributes 
the suggestion that the appropriate test must depend on the alternatives 
against which the hypothesis is to be tested to a letter of Student while 
Neyman cites the influence of a debate between Bertrand and Borel. 
The Bertrand-Bore! debate2 is concerned not only with the problem 
of how to choose a test, but also with the more fundamental question of 
whether calculations of p-va.lues a.re appropriate at all since they a.re based 
on probability models that at best are rough approximations of a much 
more complex real situation; In presenting the views of Bertrand and Borel 
in sections 2 and 3, we shall be concerned with both these aspects of the 
debate. Sections 4 and 5 discuss its relation to the Neyman-Pea.rson theory. 
2 Bertrand's views 
Neyman·s source for Bertrand's views was Bertrand's book "Calcul des 
Probabilites (1889, 1897, 1907). The· author explains the purpose of his 
book in a short preface. Probability theory is one of the most attractive 
branches of the mathematical sciences, he says, and yet one of the most 
neglected. He suggests that one of the reasons for this state of affairs may 
be Laplace's book (the Tbeorie Analytique), which is indispensable for 
the study of probability theory, but requires a great deal of mathematical 
preparation. Bertrand's book is to remedy this situation by providing an 
account of the most useful and best known results with the simplest possible 
proofs. 
Emulating Laplace, Bertrand begins his book with a nontechnical essay, 
"Les lois du hasa.rd" (The laws of chance], which gives an introductory 
overview. 3 Besides the essay, the releVa.nt chapter for the present purpose 
is chapter 7 on the probability of causes. Much of this chapter is devoted 
2 This seems the bat way to describe t!le situation although it was not a debate in 
the sense of a formal discussion. Bertrand stated certain views in his probability text 
of 1889. He was no longer alive when Borel criticized them rather sharply in a popular 
book on probability in 1914. 
3 However, in contrast t.o Laplace's ebullience and optimism, Bertrand's attitude to-
ward applications is rather negative. 
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to an attack on hypothesis testing on the grounds that the plausibility of a 
hypothesis depends on the prior probability of it being true, which is rarely 
known. 
Then, speaking about Michell's famous problem4 of whether the dose-
ness to each other of the six (visible to the naked eye) stars forming the 
Pleiades can be attributed to chance, he changes the direction of attack. 
He again first refers to the unavailability of prior probabilities, but then 
asks: "How can we decide on the unusual results that chance is incapable 
of producing?" and continues (p.166)5 
"The Pleiades appear clos.er to each other than one would naturally 
expect. This statement deserves thinking about; but when one wants to 
translate the phenomenon into numbers, the necessary ingredients are lack-
ing. In order to make the vague idea of closeness more precise, should we 
look for the smallest circle that contains the group? the largest of the an-
gular distances? the sum of squares of all the distances? the area of the 
spherical polygon of which some of the stars are the vertices and which con-
tains the others in its interior? Each of these quantities is smaller for the 
group of the Pleiades than seems plausible. Which of them should provide 
the measure of implausibility? If three of the stars form an equilateral tri-
angle, do we have to add this circumstance, which is certainly very unlikely 
apriori, to those that point tG a cause?" 
What Bertrand seems to consider here is the choice between a number 
of possible test statistics, small values of which are significant. However, in 
the last sentence he addresses an additional issue, namely what features of 
the available material to include in the observations to be analysed. 
Beyond these particular questions, Bertrand here also raises doubts 
about the scientific validity of such a probabilistic approach to testing. 
In the introductory essay he goes much further. After discussing Michell's 
own analysis, he states (p.xviii): "The application of such calculations to 
questions of this kind is a delusion and an abuse." 
Quite generally, Bertrand opposes probability models, particularly in 
the social sciences, as quite unrealistic,6 and this aspect of the debate con-
tinues today. His statement concerning Laplace's law of succession: "If 
time is to confirm and increase [the conviction that the sun will rise to-
morrow], it will be by the discovery of the laws of astronomy and not by 
the repeated success of ar. analogous game of chance", is echoed in recent 
writing of David Freedman (for example, Freedman (1985) and (1987)). 
"For recent reviews of some of the extensive literature on this problem see Gower 
(1982) and Dale (1991). 
~Since copies of the book by Bertrand (and tha.t of Borel) cited here are easily a.vail-
a.ble, l ha.ve translated the passages to be quoted for easier reading. The page references 
a.re to the edition of 1907. 
6 For further discussion of his views see for example Stigler (1986) and Daston (1988). 
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3 Borel's reply 
A very different position is taken by Borel in his book "Le Hasard" (1914); 
the passages given here in translation are from the revised edition of ( 1948). 
His treatment of these issues occurs in chapter 4 which, like Bertrand's 
corresponding chapter, is entitled "probability of causes". After discussing 
Bayes' theorem, Borel mentions the example of the frequency of male births 
and restates it as an urn problem. After some discussion he points out that 
"this example shows the particular form that problems of causes often take 
on. This form is the following: Is such and such a result due to chance 
or does it have a cause? It has often been observed how much this state-
ment lacks in precision. Bertrand has strongly emphasized this point.7 But 
whatever objection one ca.n raise from a logical point of view cannot pre-
vent the preceding question from arising in many situations: the theory of 
probabi~ty cannot refuse to examine it and to give an answer; the preci-
sion of the response will naturally be limited by the lack of precision in the 
question; but to refuse to answer under the pretext thatthe answer cannot 
be absolutely precise, is to place oneself on purely abstract grounds and 
to misunderstand the essential nature of the application of mathematics. 
True, the calculations provide an exact answer to every exact question; but 
in practice the questions are never exact: the given experimental facts nec-
essarily permit a certain amount of play; the same lack of precision then 
affects the result of the calculations and the would-be absolute theoretical 
precision of these calculations is pure delusion." 
Borel next turns to problems in astronomy and after some introductory 
remarks quotes the passage _about the Pleiades from Bertrand that was 
given in the preceding section·: Referring to Bertrand's equilateral trian-
gle, he writes: "If one has observed a number such as that quoted above 
[1.342517] as evaluation of an angle in tenths of seconds (in the decimal 
system), one would not think of asking to know the probability that this 
angle is exactly 13G 42' 51" 7; because one would never have asked that 
precise question before having measured the angle ... 
"The question is whether one has the same reservations in the case in 
which one states that one of the angles of the triangle formed by three stars 
has "une valeur remarquable" [a striking or noteworthy value], and is for 
example equal to the angle of the equilateral triangle (66G 66' 66"),8 or 
to a half right angle: 50 decimal degrees, or 5.000.000 tenths of a second. 
Here is what one can say on this subject: 
"One should carefully guard against the tendency to consider as striking 
an event that one has not specified beforehand, because the number of 
7 Borel here refers to Bertrand's discussion of the different interpretations tha.t can be 
given to the idea of randomness, as illustrated by his well-known treatment of Buffon's 
needle problem; cf Bertrand (1889, ch.l). 
8 The old-fashioned french angular measure "grade" is a decimal measure; a right 
angle is 100 grades. 
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such events that may appear striking, from different points of view, is very 
substantial. 
"In contrast to this, the question of grouping [i.e. clustering} in space 
is one that it is natural to ask apriori; the theory of probability does not 
enable one to resolve it with certainty but makes precise the conclusions 
one can draw from observations. 
"This precision is quite useful, because it often effectively replaces in-
ferences at which one arrives too quickly by 'common sense' ... Between 
the two extreme situations [those in which the results clearly are or are not 
significantj there are many others, namely those in which the probability 
lies between for example one hundredth and one hundred-thousandth: the 
value [the probability] has between these limits is not at all useless and 
what one can learn from it may be very valuable, no matter what Bertrand 
thinks" . 
In summary, Bertrand raises two questions: (i) on what grounds to 
prefer one test statistic to another; (ii) whether the calculation of a p-
value, once the test statistic has been chosen, is at all useful in view of the 
shaky assumptions underlying the typical probability model. 
To the first point Borel replies with the idea that the test statistic should 
represent some striking feature of the situation; on the second he asserts his 
unshaken faith in the value of probabilistic calculations even though they 
are only approximations to the true values. 
It should be noted that neither of these authors offers any direct sugges-
tion that the test should be based on more plausible alternatives although 
both Paul Levy and Neyman were later to interpret Borel's coounents in 
this way. 
4 Circonstances remarquables 
The first mention of the views of Bertrand and Borel in Neyman's pa-
pers occur in Neyman (1929) where he refers to Bertrand's critique of the 
Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing and then mentions:9 
"M. Borel who also discusses analogous questions, observes that the 
correct judgment concerning a statistical hypothesis depends on the choice 
of the aspect of the observed fa.ct f(E) which in some way must be 'remar-
quable'. This idea of a remarkable aspect which is a. bit vague can be made 
precise if one agrees to consider also alternative hypotheses." 
The debate between the two french mathematicians is discussed at 
greater length in Neyman and Pearson (1933), and Neyman returns to 
it again in Neyman (1935) where he writes:9 
".. . the origin of the general theory of testing hypotheses is linked 
to most interesting remarks of french mathematicians, particularly of J. 
9 My translation of the original french. 
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Bertrand (1889) and M.E. Borel (1932). They considered the process of hy-
pothesis testing_ which is basically the one employed by the english school. .. 
"It is known that Bertrand was skeptical about the scientific value of 
the results of such a process. On the other hand, M. Borel insi:;ted that 
such a result can be valid provided the feature /(E) of the observed facts 
that serve as basis for testing N, be 'en quelque sorte remarquable'. 
"This last remark preceded a series of works [by Neyman Pearson, .a.nd 
others] which basically strove to give a p~ecise meaning \oJJor:el's-sonie~hat 
vague words ... " 
How much importance Neyman attached to the influence of Borel's re-
mark can be seen from the fact that late in life he returned to it again in 
Neyman (1977), a.n account of his views on statistics. He mentions that the 
methodology for testing hypotheses "was the_subject of a lively discussion 
by Borel and others", and goes on to say that "Borel was optimistic but 
insisted that: (a) the criterion to test a hypothesis -·- must be selected not 
after the examination of the re.m.lts of ob,ervation, but before, and (b) this 
criterion should be a. function of the observations 'en quelque sorte remar-
quable'. It is these remarks ofBorel that served as an inspiration to Egon 
S. Pearson and myself in our effort to build a. frequentist theory of testing 
hypotheses". 
Neyman sent a preprint of this paper to E.S. Pearson who expressed 
himself10 delighted with it ("so delighted that I have started devouring it, 
although only received five hours ago!" he wrote) and who attached to his 
reply to Neyman a large number of comments. In one of the first of these 
he takes exception to Neyman's attribution of inspiration cited above. He 
writt>.s: 
"I remember that you produced this quotation when we began to get 
our [1933J paper into shape and write it up. This must have been during 
the period 1930/31, or even as early as my summer visit to Poland of 
1929. I had not heard of the Borel quotation until you started to draft 
the introductory section of our paper. The words may have for a year or 
two been acting as an inspiration to you, but while I at once felt the words 
relevant and important, my approach was a. different one, and was not I 
think altered by inspiration from the words." 
Pearson goes on to say that in 1925 or 1926 he had begun to question 
the basis of the t-test and to ask: Why use that particular statistic? and 
that this led to the question: 'How choose the rejection region?' He then 
continues: 
"The above stages led up to Borel's requirement of finding ... a criterion 
which was 'a function of the observations 'en quelque sorte remarquable' . 
"Now my point is that you and I (perhaps my first leading) had our-
101n an unpublished letter of September 28, 1976, which is contained in the Neyman 
Collection of the Bancroft Library, Univel'Sity of California, Berkeley. 
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selves reached the Borel requirement independently of Borel, because we 
were serious humane thinkers; Borel's expression neatly capped our own 
requirement." 
As mentioned in the introduction, a strong outside influence had also 
affected Pearson's thinking. This was a letter11 by Student written in an 
answer to a question by Pearson. This letter contains the crucial suggestion: 
"If there is an alternative hypothesis which will explain the occurrence of 
the sample with a more reasonable probability ... you will be very much 
more inclined to consider that the original hypothesis is not true." 
Pearson must very soon have communicated this idea to Neyman be-
cause a letter of Neyman's to Pearson, dated December 9, 1926 begins: ''I 
think that to have the possibility of testing it is necessary to adopt such a 
principle as Student's, ... " (Reid (1982), p.70). On the other hand, there 
appears to be no mention of Borel in this or other letters of Neyman's 
to Pearson of this period. This combination of circumstances lends some 
support to Pearson's recollections.12 
It is interesting to note that Neyman was not the only one on whom 
Borel's discussion of tests of randomness made a deep impression. Paul 
Levy in his "Calcul des Probabilites (1925) treats this topic in a section 
which he acknowledges to be largely borrowed from Borel. He there also 
mentions the role played by "proprietes remarquables" and goes on to anal-
yse the meaning of this phrase. And he comes to the conclusion which - by 
whatever conunon or separate routes - Neyman and Pearson were also to 
reach. "Une propriete remarquable", he writes, "est une propriete facile a 
expliquer par une cause autre que le hasard." 13 (p.93). [A striking property 
is a property that is easy to explain by a cause other than pure chance.] 
5 The Bertrand-Borel debate and the Neyman-Pearson theory 
The basic concepts of the Neyman-Pearson theory: rejection region, type 1 
error, alternatives to the hypothesis, and power, have became so embedded 
in our statistical language and thought that it is difficult for us to see the 
situation as it was in the first quarter of the century. The debate of the 
French probabilists of that period provides a window into their thinking. 
What strikes the modern reader is the vagueness of the discussion which 
is of course inevitable when no conceptual framework and suitable termi-
nology are available. As a partial explanation of "the obscurity which 
envelops the theoretical bases of statistical methods" Fisher in his funda-
mental paper, "On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics" 
(1922) suggests that "it appears to be widely thought, or rather felt, that in 
11 This letter of May 11, 1926 was published in part in Pearson (1939). 
12 The Neyma.n-Pearson story is told from Pear.son's point of view in Pearson {1966) 
and from Neyman's in Reid (1982). 
13 Neyma.n's only reference to Levy in this general context is in Neyman (1932) where 
be attributes the concept of "remarqua.ble" characters to "E. Borel and P. Levy" in the 
books quoted here. 
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a subject in which all results are liable to greater or smaller errors, precise 
definition of ideas or concepts is, if not impossible, at least not a practical 
necessity." 
In this paper Fisher did in fact create the needed theoretical frame-
work in the context of estimation. He formulated his theory in terms of 
a parametric family of distributions (of the observations), posed the prob-
lem of choosing a suitable estimator, defined a measure of accuracy, and 
introduced both relative and absolute efficiency. However, Fisher did not 
extend the theory to hypothesis testing, which - like his predecessors -
he discU8sed only in the context of specific examples or classes of examples. 
It remained for Neyman and Pearson to formulate a general theory of 
hypothesis testing. Fisher's parametric families provided a way to specify 
both hypothesis and alternatives. Instead of spe~ing, as Bertrand and 
Borel ha.d done, of choosing an;1ong vaguely indicated test criteria, the class 
of available tests is now clearly defined as the class of . all possible level 
a rejection regions. Furthermore the concept of power made possible a 
comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of different tests and led 
to maximal power as a principle for chooing a "best" test. 
There is a world of difference between the vague musings of Bertrand 
and Borel, and the clearly defined structure of the Neyman-Pearson the-
ory. In particular, the latter of course permits quantitative evaluations and 
compansons. 
It is just this clarity and precision, at the time only an unrealized idea, 
that is at the heart of the .debate between Bertrand and Borel. Bertrand 
., 
would undoubtedly object to'many of the uses to which tests are put (and 
he would not be alone in this). It is true, in particular, that the models 
from which the analysis is derived often have a rather flimsy basis and even 
at best are only approximations. The theory has tried to meet these and 
related objections by studying the robustness of existing tests, developing 
new more robust alternative tests , by providing simultaneous test proce-
dures to deal with the problem of multiplicity, and so on, all within the 
general Neyman-Pearson framework. 
To the many objections that remain, Borel has an answer in the passage 
quoted in Section 3 which can be summarized as follows. "The theory 
of probability cannot refuse to examine" the situation and to come up 
with an answer. Of course, the real situation is much more complex than 
the model allows for; the precise answers that the calculations provide for 
hypothetically precise questions are only rough approximate solutions of the 
much less precise real problems. We should therefore not take the analysis 
too literally, put too much stock in the precise numerical answers, but -
we should not gixe up on the enterprise. It provides iriva.luable gUidance, a 
check on undisciplined speculation, on "inferences at which one arrives too 
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